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CHANGES WROUGHT IN THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
BY THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this article is to analyze the Statute of Frauds
provision of the Uniform Commercial Code (section 402.201(1) of
the Wisconsin statutes). This will be accomplished in part by an
analysis of the ways in which the Code provision differs from prior
law, which in Wisconsin was the Uniform Sales Act, and the case law
which has developed under the Sales Act. By analyzing cases decided
under the Code in Pennsylvania, and the policies and philosophy which
motivated the draftsmen, an effort will be made to indicate the manner
in which Wisconsin courts will decide issues arising under the new
provisions. A secondary purpose of this article is to consider the value
of the Statute as it has existed and to come to a judgment as to the
probable value and wisdom of the changes.
The Code Statute of Frauds does not include choses in action as
did the Sales Act, but is limited to goods. The monetary limit has been
changed from $50 to $500. Memorandum requirements have been
lessened in that the requisite signature has been liberalized and terms
may be absent or inaccurately stated. In so far as the contract is not
enforceable beyond the quantity stated in the memo, they have been
made more stringent. The letter of confirmation will change the result
in a certain class of cases in which a receiver of such a letter has not
responded. The law with respect to satisfaction by receipt or part pay-
ment has been changed so that the bar of the Statute is only removed
as to goods actually received or paid for. There is a new proviso specify-
ing that a judicial admission will satisfy the Statute. There is a change
with respect to the special manufacturing situation; now, change of
position is required.
In order to understand the Statute as it has existed under prior law
and also to come to a conclusion as to its wisdom and therefore the
wisdom of changing it, it is useful to consider the conditions which
prompted its original enactment. Obviously a change in the conditions
under which merchants and lay people must conduct their affairs
would warrant a change in the law. If the common law cannot accom-
.modate itself sufficiently to changed conditions, the legislature must
take the step.
With the development of the action of assumpsit in the fourteenth
century, oral promises became enforceable. Enforcement could be ob-
tained on the strength of the oral testimony of witnesses. Therefore,
in 1677 the Statute of 29 Charles II was enacted. The purpose was to
prevent placing an obligation by perjury on a person who had never
assented to assume it." The results which the Statute has brought about
12 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §275, at 2(1950).
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have subjected it to a great deal of criticism.2 For this reason it has
been construed narrowly. Besides being criticized for permitting prom-
isors to repudiate their contracts with impunity, it has been castigated
for the immense complexity it has introduced into the law. Its need
has decreased with advances made in the law of evidence.3 Another
criticism can be based on the fact that a motive for passage of the
Statute was the condition of the jury trial which was at that time un-
developed.4 One may conclude that its only real value is in its in terrorem
service and that it should be retained for this purpose but applied as
seldom as possible in a litigated case.5
At this point the history and results of the Statute should be re-
lated to the purposes and policies of the Code.
The underlying purposes and policies of this Act are (a) to
simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial
transactions; (b) to permit the continued expansion of commer-
cial practices through custom, usage and agreement of the par-
ties; (c) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdic-
tions.'
Karl Llewellyn, chief reporter of the Code, gives a more specific
statement of the aim of the Code in altering the Statute of Frauds.
The effort of the Code has been to deal with the essential pur-
poses for which the Statute was designed, while getting and keep-
ing away from the abuses: to wit, to make utterly essential some
evidence in writing and over signature, or else some pretty good
other evidence that rests on something more tangible than word
of mouth .... [Tihe Code adds both the desire and a reasonable
machinery for a businessman to be able to rely on what both
parties sign and on the fact that he has procured a memo signed
by the other party.?
MEMORANDUM REQUIREMENTS
The first major area of change under the Code is effected by the
provision which sets forth the memorandum requirements.8 The pur-
poses sought to be achieved by these changes and also some additional
clarification as to the construction the draftsmen wish to see applied
to these sections is afforded by the official comments. As above indi-
2 1d. at 3. Such gain in the prevention of fraud as is attained by the Statute
is attained at the expense of permitting persons who have in fact made oral
promises to break those promises with impunity and to cause disappointment
and loss to honest men.
32 STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 196 (1906).
4 THAYER, EVIDENCE 430 (1950).
52 CORBIN, supra note 1, at 13.
G UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §1-102 (2) [all references are to the 1962 Of-
ficial Text with Comments].
7NEW YORK STATE LAW REVISION COMZM'N STUDY OF U.C.C. No. 65(B),
REPORTS OF PUBLIc HEARINGS ON THE CODE 45 (1954).
S UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-201 (1): "Except as otherwise provided in
this section a contract for the sale of goods for the price of $500 or more is
not enforceable by way of action or defense unless there is some writing
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cated, the writing need not contain all of the material terms, and the
material terms that are stated need not be precisely stated. "All that is
required is that the writing afford a basis for believing that the offered
oral evidence rests on a real transaction." The quantity term is the
only one which must appear, and emphasis is placed on the permissibility
of omitting the price term. The draftsmen summarize the requirements
thus: (1) the memorandum must evidence a contract for the sale of
goods, not some other kind of transaction; (2) it must be signed by the
party to be charged and this signature may consist of any authentica-
tion; and (3) it must specify a quantity.10 A further limitation is that
the contract is not enforceable beyond the quantity shown in the writ-
ing. Under prior law the existence of a sufficient memorandum gave
a party an opportunity to attempt to prove a contract for any quantity.
The memorandum requirements are an important departure from
prior law. A line of Wisconsin cases established what Wisconsin re-
quired of a memo under the Sales Act. Wiedner v. National Fisheries
Co." required that the memorandum state the price term. This case
involved an action to recover damages for the breach of a contract
for a carload of fish. Telegrams were relied on as the required memo-
randum. The court held the telegrams insufficient for the reason that
they did not show that the price was twelve cents per pound. To ascer-
tain that term, recourse to parol testimony was necessary.
S. T. Edwards & Co. v. Slawano Milk Products Co.12 also held a
memorandum insufficient. Defendant promised to sell a certain quantity
of dried skim milk to plaintiff. Plaintiff's acceptance specified that the
skim milk be of first quality. A telephone conversation was relied on
to show that defendant offered milk of first quality. Since no memo
indicated that defendant offered milk of first quality, the purported
acceptance was held to be a counter offer. "[I]t must appear from the
several writings, without resorting to parol evidence, what the con-
tract is."
'
"
3
Erving Paper Mills v. Hudson-Sharp Mach. Co."4 is a recent federal
case applying Wisconsin law. It sets forth in some detail the Wisconsin
memorandum requirements and clearly illustrates the unreasonable-
ness of prior law in this area. The case involved an action for damages
for the breach of a contract to manufacture two wrapping machines.
sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been made between the
parties and signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought or by
his authorized agent or broker. A writing is not insufficient because it omits
or incorrectly states a term agreed upon but the contract is not enforceable
under this paragraph beyond the quantity of goods shown in such writing."
9 UNIFORM CoM MERCIAL CODE §2-201, comment at 51.
10 Ibid.
1a 173 Wis. 559, 181 N.W. 719 (1921).
12 211 Wis. 378, 247 N.W. 465 (1933).
'13 Id. at 381, 247 N.W. at 466.
'4 223 F. Supp. 913 (E. D. Wis. 1963).
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Defendant failed to supply the machines in question to plaintiff. Two
writings, a purchase order and an acceptance letter, were relied on to
take the oral contract out of the Statute of Frauds. The court admitted
that on its face the memorandum consisting of these two writings ap-
peared complete. It found, however, that the sealing method to be used
by the machine was an essential term not mentioned in the memorandum
although it had been discussed by the parties. "The unfortunate result
is that although the parties certainly knew what was intended in this
regard, the terms were omitted from the memo of the contract."15
The court accordingly held the contract void under the Statute. Al-
though the result of this finding was changed on motion for rehearing,
it is illustrative of the unfortunate results to which the stringent memo-
randum requirements of the Sales Act have led. On rehearing also, the
court found that the words "efficiently polyethelene wrap," as used in
the memorandum, were too uncertain. "To establish the description of
the machine intended to be sold, it would be necessary to give inde-
pendent effect to the parol understanding as to the meaning of the term.
This would result not in mere identification but the supplying of a
portion of the description by parol." 16
Until there is some case law on the subject, one can attempt to de-
termine what a Wisconsin court under the Code will require of a
memorandum only (1) by a close reading of the Statute and (2) by
looking at cases arising in other jurisdictions. The statutory provision
and the draftsmen's comment thereto have already been discussed.
There is a paucity of cases from other jurisdictions construing section
2-201 of the Code. Pennsylvania has several, it being the only state in
which the Code has been in effect for any length of time.
Arcuri v. Weiss 17 is a Pennsylvania case construing the new Statute
of Frauds. Arcuri and Weiss had discussions regarding Arcuri's in-
tended purchase of Weiss's restaurant. A check for $500 payable to
Weiss and bearing the notation "Tentative deposit on tentative pur-
chase of 1415 City Line Ave., Phila. Restaurant, Fixtures, Equipment
Goodwill" was delivered to Weiss. Subsequently, purchaser Arcuri
decided not to go through with the sale. Plaintiff relied on the check
as a memorandum of the oral contract. The court held the check in-
sufficient. It based this holding on a finding that the writing did not
indicate that a contract for sale had been made. As the first decision
construing section 2-201, it is appropriate to quote the court directly:
The purpose of the Uniform Commercial Code which was written
in terms of current commercial practices, was to meet the con-
temporary needs of a fast moving society. It changed and simpli-
fied much of the law which it has supplanted but it also sets forth
15 Id. at 925.
16Id. at 927.
17 198 Pa. Super 506, 184 A. 2d 24 (1962).
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many safeguards against sharp commercial practices. This sec-
tion we feel is one such safeguard. While it does not require a
writing which embodies all the essential terms of a contract, and
even goes so far as to permit omission of the price, it does re-
quire some writing which indicates that a contract for sale has
been made."8
The first requirement under the new Statute of Frauds as enumerated
by the draftsmen in the official comment is absent here; that is, that the
memorandum must evidence a contract for the sale of goods. Because
of the repeated use of the word tentative, the court concluded that it
was not the intention of the parties to contract. The court further found
that no oral agreement had been reached, that the minds of the parties
had never met.
Professor Corbin has made some comments as to what he believes
will be the requirements of a writing under the Code. In particular he
stresses the requirement that the memorandum must show that a con-
tract for sale has been made "between the parties." As under earlier
statutes, the parties must be in some way identified or described. He
feels that the older authorities on this point will remain applicable
under the Code. He also points out the fact that the writing must evi-
dence a contract for the sale of goods and not something else.19
The remarks of Karl Llewellyn are clear and persuasive enough to
warrant extensive quoting in any discussion of the wisdom of the
changes wrought by the Code with respect to the memorandum. It was
his conviction that one of the most damaging aspects of the Statute of
Frauds was the doctrine which allowed a memorandum complete on
its face to be attacked with respect to a provision not included in the
memorandum. This allegation was enough to render a memorandum
insufficient. With regard to this matter, Professor Llewellyn says:
Now is it really possible that any business man likes this astound-
ing rule of law under which the other party can always and at
fraudulent will throw open any memo, even when complete in
appearance and signed by both, alleging some error in some term,
or by alleging even some omission of some term never in fact
even discussed ?2o
He feels that this is a statute for the encouragement of perjury. Under
the Code, of course, the memo need only be enough to document the
existence of a deal.
Again in discussing the memo requirement, Professor Llewellyn
states that as long as you are sure you have a deal you can go to the jury
and the risk is small, mostly because the top limit for which you can
is Id. at 26, 184 A. 2d at 26.
19 2 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §507, at 730 (1950).
2°NEW YORK STATE LAW REVISION COMM'N STUDY OF U.C.C. No. 65(B), RE-
PORTS OF PUBLIC HEARINGS ON THE CODE 47 (1954).
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be sued is the quantity stated in the memo. Because of modern business
practices, there is a very low percentage of erroneous memos."
Llewellyn comments on why the unit term is not required. The
reason he gives is that this requirement would exclude many legitimate
deals.2 2 Very likely if a memo is sufficient to indicate a deal, it will
indicate the unit. For example, a mere notation of a quantity such as
"I agree to purchase ten" without additional clarification probably
would not be sufficient to indicate the presence of a deal.
A look at the results of the Wisconsin cases discussed further
points up the wisdom of the Code's changes with respect to the memo
requirement. It seems that in reason and justice the contract in Wiedner
v. National Fisheries Co.2 3 should be enforced. There the memo was
held insufficient merely because resort to parol was necessary to estab-
lish the price term. It would not have been difficult to have established
the price. S. T. Edwards & Co. v. Shawano Milk Products Co. 24 is
another bad example of pre-Code law. Here the only term which had
to be supplied by parol was one establishing that defendant had offered
milk of first quality. For this reason a promisor was able to escape
liability. As above mentioned, the result of Ewing Paper Mills v. Hud-
son-Sharp Mach. Co.25 was also unfortunate. Presumably the Code
would change the results of all of these cases.
One might well ask what has induced courts to arrive at such un-
reasonable conclusions. The only possible answer appears to be a policy
which prohibits the jury from tampering with the terms of an oral
contract. Courts have traditionally held the conviction that a jury was
not to be trusted with determining such issues as price, quantity, terms
of payment, and terms of shipment. The Code by its terms overrules
this policy. The draftsmen felt that quantity was the only term which
should be kept from the jury. If, however, the quantity is evidenced by
a writing, the jury is free to determine all other terms. It can't err very
much with respect to price since the market provides a check. The other
matters such as time of delivery and terms of payment are not so essen-
tial that a departure from the intention of the parties would result in
injustice.
Manifestly, the policy of the Code will be more likely to effect
justice between the parties than prior policy under which one was un-
able to enforce his contract simply because some very minor term was
inaccurately or ambiguously stated.
The following statement of Professor Llewellyn is an excellent
21 Id. at 100.
22Id. at 116.
23 Note 11 supra.
24 Note 12 supra.
25 Note 14 supra.
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summation of the purpose and a very cogent argument for the wisdom
of the change:
Now, just take a look for a moment at what the statute of frauds
has raised in the way of trouble and see whether this isn't a wise
and at the same time a very safe provision. What you have got
as a requirement under the Code is that there shall be no doubt
that there was a contract for sale. That is No. one. Secondly, that
you can't enforce it beyond the quantity stated. You can be in-
accurate about other things or leave them out, mostly-price, for
example, you can leave out. You refer to the market-you have
to keep the jury from going crazy. You can't swear too much of
a price onto a guy when there is a market around to test whether
or not it is likely that that was the term agreed upon. But here
is the kind of thing you get under the present law. . . . [N]o
matter how perfect a memo is... the law is clear. . . that the
fellow who doesn't want the contract enforced can say. .. 'Sure,
that is the memo I signed. But there was a term we agreed upon
which is not in that memo.' And he can give all evidence as to
that term and nobody can keep it from being given. He goes to
the jury on whether it was agreed, and if it was agreed, the con-
tract is unenforceable. 26
The other memorandum change involves the signature. The official
comment provides that the word "signed" includes any authentication
which identifies the parties to be charged."27 North American Seed Co.
v. Cedarburg Supply Co. 28 held a memo insufficient because it was
merely initialled. Presumably the Code would have changed the result
in this case. This liberalization of the authentication requirement is
also commented upon by Professor Llewellyn. He was answering a
criticism charging that the liberalization providing that any form of
authentication is sufficient would cause litigation and confusion in the
law. He remarks in defense that here the law as derived from about
four hundred cases is simply stated.
2 9  I
LETTER OF CONFIRMATION
In substance section 2-201(2)30 provides that between merchants a
letter of confirmation will be binding on the recipient thereof if he
doesn't give notice of his objection within ten days of receipt. The
official comment further clarifies this section: "Between merchants,
failure to answer a written confirmation of a contract within ten days
of receipt is tantamount to a writing under subsection (2) and is suf-
ficient against both parties under subsection (1)."31 It goes on to point
26NEw YORK STATE LAW REVISIoN COMM'N, STUDY OF U.C.C. No. 65(B) RE-
PORTS OF PuRLIc HEARINGS ON THE CODE 99 (1954).
27 Note 9 supra.
28247 Wis. 31, 18 N.W. 2d 466 (1945).
29 NEw YORK STATE LAW REVISION COM I'N STUDY OF U.C.C. No. 65(B), RE-
PORTS OF PU3LIC HEARINGS ON THE CODE 95 (1954).3 0 UNIORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-201(2).
3 1 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-201, comment at 51.
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out that the only effect of this section is to take away the defense of
the Statute of Frauds. The party alleging the contract still has the
burden of proving that an oral contract was entered into before the
written confirmation.
This provision is entirely new. The purpose of it is to rectify an
abuse which developed under the Sales Act. The custom arose among
business people of confirming oral telephone contracts by sending a
letter of confirmation. This letter was binding as a memorandum on
the sender, but not on the recipient because he hadn't signed it. The
abuse was that the recipient, not being bound, could perform or not
according to his whim and the market, whereas the sender had to per-
form. Obviously under these circumstances, sending a letter of con-
firmation was a dangerous thing to do. Section 2-201(2) cures the
abuse by holding an unsigning recipient bound unless he communi-
cates his objection within ten days.
Because of the definition of "merchant" contained in section 2-104,
this section will have wider application than one might at first glance
anticipate.
Merchant means a person who deals in goods of the kind or
otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having knowl-
edge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the
transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill may be attributed
by his employment of an agent or broker or other intermediary
who by his occupation holds himself out as having such knowledge
or skill.3 2
Because of this definition the new rule may be applied against a person
who is not a merchant, but who is familiar with the practices connected
with the use of confirmations.3 3 Since any person in business should
know about the confirmatory memorandum custom, almost any person
in business should be a merchant for purposes of this section. 34
Another qualification should be noted. The party receiving the memo
must have reason to know of its contents. In this connection both sender
and recipient should be aware of the provisions of section 1-201(27)3 5
defining notice by an organization. The section provides that such notice
is effective from the time it is brought to the notice of the person con-
ducting the transaction or from the time it would have been brought
to its attention had due diligence been exercised. Those charged with
sending the confirmatory letter should accordingly take careful note of
who is conducting the transaction so that the memo will be effective.
Several cases construing this provision have arisen in Pennsylvania.
32 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-104 (1).
33 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §507, at 731 (1950).
34NEw YoR STATE LAW REVisioN COMMI'N STUDY OF U.C.C. No. 65(B) RE-
PORTS OF PUBLIc HEARINGs ON THE CODE 96 (1954).
35 UNNIFOni COMMERCIAL CODE §1-201 (27).
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In Harry Rubin & Sons v. Consolidated Pipe Co.36 plaintiff purchaser
brought an action against the seller for failure to deliver a portion of
hoops and materials as per oral contracts. The court held that a letter
from plaintiff to defendant took both contracts out of the Statute.
The letter read:
As per our phone conversation of today kindly enter our order
for the following:
60,000 Tee-Vee Hoops made of rigid polyethylene tubing
from lengths of 8'10" to 9'2"; material to weigh 15 feet per
lb., colors, red, green and yellow packed 2 Dozen per carton
393 each
It is our understanding that these will be produced upon com-
pletion of the present order of 30,000 hoops.
This case provides a good illustration of the required letter of con-
firmation. It makes reference to a phone conversation, is signed by the
sender, and states a quantity.
In John H. Wickersham E & C Co. v. Arbutus Steel Co.,37 plaintiff
tried to establish a writing as a letter of confirmation and failed. De-
fendant had proposed furnishing plaintiff with a certain amount of
steel. Plaintiff Wickersham sent defendant the following memo:
It is our intention to award you a contract for furnishing all
short span steel joints, bridging anchors, ceiling extensions...
for the sum of $21,800....
This award will be contingent upon our receiving a contract
from the Owners for the General Construction and upon your
furnishing reasonable assurance of your ability to furnish the
material when required.
It is also understood that you will prepare Shop Drawings ...
prior to the receipt of a formal order, this work to be performed
at your own risk.
Defendant did not respond to this memo within ten days, but subse-
quently withdrew its original proposal. Plaintiff alleged that its memo
satisfied the requirements of section 2-201(2) that (1) there be a
writing in confirmation of the oral contract, (2) the writing bind
the sender, (3) the writing be received, and (4) no reply has been
made. The court held as to (1) that this memo did not refer to a prior
dealing and was not a confirmation of an oral contract. Under (2) the
writing would not have bound the sender because it did not name a
quantity and because the order was made contingent on the general
award. Under (3) the complaint did not allege that the memorandum
had been received.
36 396 Pa. 506, 153 A. 2d 472 (1959).
3758 Lanc. L.R. 164 (Pa. 1962).
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Section 2-201(2) fulfills an avowed purpose of the Code to make
the law consistent with the practices of business people. It does so by
making a convenient and highly useful business practice safe for the
signing sender of a letter of confirmation. Hawkland points out that
the section will not materially aid those trying to perpetrate fraud.3 8
Such a person would still have to prove the existence of the oral con-
tract.
PART PERFORMANCE
The law with respect to satisfaction by receipt or part performance
has been changed. "A contract ... is enforceable with respect to goods
for which payment has been made and accepted or which have been
received and accepted." 39 Under prior law acceptance of or payment
for a portion of goods opened the door to proof of a contract for a
greater amount. Thus the seller who agreed to sell one case of widgets
and who had accepted payment for one case could have foisted upon
him a contract for ten cases. Gedanke v. Wisconsin Evaporated Milk
Co.40 is illustrative of this proposition. This case was an action for
damages for failure of defendant to deliver to plaintiff one hundred
cases of evaporated milk. The parties entered a contract under which
it was alleged that defendant was to deliver the milk to plaintiff. Plain-
tiff was also to purchase defendant's surplus butter. Defendant sold
and delivered a quantity of butter, but failed to deliver the milk. The
court in allowing recovery held that the entire contract was taken out
of the Statute by plaintiff's acceptance of the butter.
As the official comment indicates, under the Code partial per-
formance is a substitute only for goods which have been accepted or
for which payment has been made and accepted. Part performance
makes admissible evidence of other terms necessary to a just appor-
tionment.41 Whether this comment will be given effect is open to ques-
tion. If it is, it may subvert the purpose of the part performance
limitation by allowing the introduction into evidence of terms relating
to a greater quantity of goods than that actually received or paid for.
Williamson v. MartZ42 provides us with a judicial interpretation of
this section. Here the parties verbally agreed that plaintiff would sell
and defendant purchase two two hundred gallon vats. The purchase
price was $1,600 (each vat costing $800), defendant paying $100 on
account. Plaintiff was denied recovery, the court holding that the Code
denies the enforcement of the contract where in the case of a single
object the amount paid is less than the full price. The result of this
case seems to indicate that if the contract is to be given effect at all,
3S 1 HAWKLAND, TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§1.120102, at 27 (1964).
39 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-201 (3) (c).
40 215 Wis. 370, 254 N.W. 660 (1934).
- UNIFORM COMMERcIAL CODE §2-201, comment at 52.
42 11 Pa. D. & C. 2d 33, 19 Monroe L.R. 24 (1956).
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there must be full payment of some divisible part. The one vat would
have to have been completely paid for. On reason, however, it seems
a safe assumption that the $100 indicates the sale of at least one vat.
The change seems a wise one. The justification for the part per-
formance doctrine has always been its evidentiary value. The overt
acts of the parties are held to indicate the existence of a contract, thus
making the writing unnecessary as a protection against fraud. Part
performance, however, indicates a contract only with respect to goods
which have been received and paid for. The policy of the Statute should
apply to an allegation respecting other goods.
43
SPECIAL MANUFACTURING
There is a change in the provision regarding specially manufactured
goods. 44 This change results from a shift in philosophy. Under the
Sales Act the special manufacturer was excepted on the ground that
his contract involved "work and labor." Thus if the seller was not to
do the manufacturing himself, but had procured another to do it, he
was not excepted from the Statute because he was not a "worker." The
Code excepts the special manufacturer on the ground that he is in a
peculiarly vulnerable position with respect to resale of the goods.
Therefore the seller need not himself be the manufacturer to be ex-
cepted. Consistent with the new philosophy, there is an additional
requirement: the seller must have changed position in order to lift the
bar of the Statute "by either a substantial beginning of their manu-
facture or commitments for their procurement." This requirement is
consistent with the new philosophy because only those who have
changed position are in a vulnerable position with respect to resale.4 5
This provision is not satisfactory. The fact that goods have been
specially manufactured for an alleged buyer does not necessarily indi-
cate the existence of a contract between the parties. For this reason
it provides the unscrupulous with opportunities for the commission of
fraud. 40 Because the Code has liberalized the Statute of Frauds in the
ways above indicated and because it is therefore much easier to come
within one of the exceptions, it is at least arguable that this provision
could have been dropped altogether.
ADmISSIONS
If the party against whom enforcement is sought admits in his
pleading, testimony or otherwise, in court that a contract for sale
43 PENNSYLVANIA BAR ASS'N NOTES 85.
44 UNIFORM COM[MERCIAL CODE §2-201(3) (b) : "A contract which does not satisfy
the requirements of subsection (1) but which is valid in other respects is
enforceable if the party against whom enforcement is sought admits in his
pleading, testimony or otherwise in court that a contract for sale was made,
but the contract is not enforceable under this provision beyond the quantity
of goods admitted. ... "
45 1 HAWKLAND, TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§1.1204, at31 (1964).46 Ibid.
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was made, but the contract is not enforceable under this provision
beyond the quantity of goods admitted.47
It has been made clear that a demurrer is not the pleading contem-
plated by the Code. The question was adjudicated in Beter v. Helman.4 8
Defendant raised the Statute of Frauds as a defense by an objection
in the nature of a demurrer. Plaintiff argued that the demurrer was an
admission in a pleading of the existence of a contract. The court ruled
that section 2-201 applied to an admission in a responsive pleading;
to construe it otherwise would result in the elimination of preliminary
objections in the nature of demurrer whenever the Statute of Frauds
is being raised.
The new provision also raises the question of whether plaintiff can
compel defendant at trial to admit the existence of the contract. An-
other question relates to the meaning of "otherwise in court," which
is not defined. A strict construction would require the admission to be
made at the trial, while a more liberal one would include admissions
made in proceedings before trial.49 It seems that any admission made
under circumstances which are formal enough to insure its accuracy
should be sufficient to remove the bar of the Statute. Such proceedings
would probably include any conference held before trial in the presence
of a judge or court commissioner.
In the opinion of the writer the wisdom of this section is unques-
tionable. The ridiculousness of allowing a party to admit the contract
and still rely on the bar of the Statute is obvious. The only qualifica-
tions relate to the varying possible constructions given this section as
noted above.
PLEADING
In one important respect the Statute of Frauds under the Sales Act
and under the Code are identical. Both characterize a contract coming
within their terms as unenforceable rather than void. Despite the specific
language of the Sales Act, Wisconsin has held that the defense of the
Statute may be raised by demurrer and that it need not be affirmatively
pleaded. This, in effect, is a holding that the contract is void for the
particular purpose of pleading. The question thus arises of whether
Wisconsin courts will continue their prior pleading practice or, con-
sistent with the statutory language, require the Statute to be raised as
an affirmative defense. Since there has not been an alteration in statutory
language, it is not likely that Wisconsin will change its policy in this
area.
47 UNIFORM COM MERCIAL CODE §2-201(3) (b).
48 41 West. L. J. 7 (Pa. 1958).
491 HAwIKLAND, TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE§1.1203, at 30 (1964).
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CONCLUSION
Thus it is clear that the Statute of Frauds has undergone substantial
alteration. In many respects it has been liberalized. In some regards,
such as the part performance and special manufacturing provisions,
it has been made more stringent. The attempt underlying all of these
changes has been to prevent fraud, whether on the part of the party
seeking to establish a contract which was never in fact entered into,
or on the part of one seeking to avoid a verbal agreement which was.
The changes above discussed have been the means the draftsmen have
utilized in achieving their purpose. The ultimate answer to the ques-
tion of whether the Code provision will prove more effective than
prior law in preventing fraud will not be available until it has been in
effect for a period of time. A look at the record of the Code provision
in Pennsylvania and an analysis of the ways in which it satisfies con-
temporary business needs, however, indicate that it will be successful.
MARY C. CAHILL
